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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

----------------------------------------STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff - Respondent,

-v-

Case No. 15753

AARON LEE GREUBER,
Defendant-Appellant.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged in Juvenile Court with eleven
offenses of a serious and felonious nature including
first degree murder, aggravated assault, aggravated
burglary and aggravated robbery (R. p.5-6) .*

A waiver

hearing was held before the Second District Juvenile
Court, and appellant was certified for criminal proceedings in the Third District Court.

There, appellant

was convicted of aggravated burglary and aggravated
robbery.

This appeal is from the certification order

and the subsequent conviction.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
After a full hearing, the juvenile court waived
its jurisdiction and

ordered that appellant be trans-

ferred for criminal proceedings in the district court.

. d District Court record,
*Citations to R. refer to t h e Th ir
District
court
No.
30855;
citations
Tr.Institute
refer
to the
ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization providedto
by the
of Museum
and Library Servic
Library court
Services and
Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Juvenile
Transcript.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Appellant was tried in the district court and convicted
of aggravated burglary and aggravated robbery.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirrnance of the juvenile court's
order for certification and the district court's judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Respondent agrees generally with appellant's statement of facts with the following exception and additions:
The final sentence of appellant's statement of
facts reads:

"No other alternatives for treatment has

[sic] been attempted with this juvenile.••
Brief,p. 2).

(Appellant's

In making this statement appellant alleges

that only probation and "a stay on a boys' ranch" were
used to deal with him.

However, the record discloses

many attempts to use the juvenile system to reform
appellant.
Probation was tried twice (Tr. p. 45), both times
unsuccessfully (Tr. p. 53).

Appellant was sent to two

boys' ranches (Tr. p. 45-46), the second of which he
ran away from refusing to return (Tr. P. 49).

Appellant's

probation counselor established a special school program
for appellant (Tr. p. 46).

Appellant was uncooperative

so individual tutoring was arranged (Tr. p. 46).

However,

appellant's lack of motivation and poor attitude resulted
in failure of this program as well (Tr. p. 46).
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Appellant was place::1in detention twice (Tr. p. 48,
S2), and he underwent a psychological evaluation (Tr. p. 47).
These attempts proved futile and the Youth Development
Center was suggested (Tr. p. S2).

However, the author-

ities agreed that the Youth Development Center would
not be of any value in this situation (Tr. p. S4-SS,
S7, 114-llS).

In addition, appellant and his family were
assisted through a counseling program (Tr. p. 46).
However, appellant was again uncooperative (Tr. p. 46).
Family therapy was also tried, but was unsuccessful
(Tr. p. 48).

In short, as stated in the transcript,

no other appropriate services were available in the
juvenile system (Tr. p. SS).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
APPELLANT WAS NOT DEPRIVED OF ANY DUE
PROCESS RIGHTS NOR DID THE JUVENILE
COURT LACK JURISDICTION TO PROCEED
AFTER APPELLANT WAS CERTIFIED.
Appellant alleges a denial of due process but fails
to show how such denial occured.

It appears, however,

that appellant feels the Court s refusal to review his
1

initial appeal from the certification order was a
. h i'nvalidates all proceedings
denial of due process wh ic
in the District Court.

nsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Serv
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-3Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Juvenile Court ordered that the appellant,
Aaron Lee Grueber, be certified to stand trial as
an adult on June 9, 1977.

(R. p. 8)

Immediately

thereafter, and prior to commencement of proceedings
in the District Court, appellant appealed to this Court
from the certification order (See Supreme
Case No. 15322, July 1977).

Court

That appeal was dismissed

on the court's own motion, on July 26, 1977.

At that

time this court did not interpret U.C.A. §78-3a-51 of
the Juvenile Court Act to provide for a direct appeal
from a certification order.

State

cou~ts

across the

country are divided almost equally on the issue of
whether a certification is a final, appealable judgment,
so Utah was certainly not alone in its practice of
disallowing appeals until after the trial in the adult
court.

Furthermore, direct appeal from a certification

order has never been held to be a constiutional right,
denial of which would constitute a violation of due
process.
After the court's dismissal of his original appeal,
appellant did not request a

r~hearing

or present any

arguments to the court on the propriety of the dismissal.
He was tried and convicted in the District Court and
sentenced to a prison term.

He has now been in prison

ponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
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for over a year and complains that he is being subjected
to the hardships of prison life because the court did
not hear his original appeal and his certification was
allowed to stand (Appellant's Brief, p. 3).

However,

i t should be noted that appellant was convicted and
sentenced in February, 1978.

(R. p. 71).

He filed his

Notice of Appeal on March 24, 1978 (R. p. 72), and
then extended his time for filing his brief for over a
year.

Thus, his prolonged stay at the prison can be

attributed at least asmuch to his own delays as to the
fact that his original certification appeal was not
heard.
In January, 1978, this court, upon rehearing in
State in the Interest of Atcheson, 575 P. 2d 181 (Utah,
1978) , decided

that under the statutory language of U.C.A.

78-3a-51, a certification order is a final, appealable
order.

This decision was based upon the wording of the

Utah statute not on constitutional grounds.

§78-3a-51

U.C.A. 1953 provides in part:
when a criminal complaint is filed in a court
of competent jurisdiction charging ~he chi~d
with the offense certified under this s~ction,
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is
terminated as to the child or person concerned.
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Based upon this Language, the court concluded:
The fact that jurisdiction is specifically
terminated by the statutory provisions at
such time as a complaint is filed is clearly
indicative of the finality of a certification
order. From and after that time jurisdiction is irrevocably transferred to the district court.
575 p. 2d at 183.
Thus, the right to appeal directly from a certification
order is not a constitutional

right, and appellant

was not deprived of any due process protections when his
appeal was dismissed.
The Atcheson decision gives juveniles the option
to appeal the certification order prior to commencement of District Court proceedings, but it does not
mandate that the appeal be taken at the time.
juvenile offender can still appeal the

A

validity

of a certification order after the trial in the district
court, together with any issues raised in the trial.
There is no authority in the Atcheson case or elsewhere
for appellant's proposition that the District Court
had no jurisdiction until after he had appealed the
certification order.

(Appellant's Brief, p. 4).

Such

a theory would invalidate every District Court proceeding
which has taken place after certification if the
juvenile did not appeal from the certification order
prior to the District Court trial.

This principle, as

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Service
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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espoused by appellant, wou ld certianly
·
provide a simple
means of insuring that the District Court never had
J·urisdiction to act.

If , as appe 11 ant alleges, the

adult court does not have jurisdiction until the
juvenile appeals his certification order, the juvenile
could forever hold off the adult trial simply by never
appealing from the certification order.
It is

true, as appellant alleges on page 4 of his

brief, that the District Court does not obtain jurisdiction until after the Juvenile Court has made a full
investigation and determination that certification would
be in the best interests of the child.
p. 4).

(Appellant's Brief

However, there is no basis in law for

the

proposition that the District Court does not obtain
jurisdiction until after the juvenile appeals from the
certification order.

In this case, there was a full

and complete investigation and hearing which led to the
Juvenile Court's determination that certification was
necessary and proper.

If the certification is upheld

by this Court, then the proceedings in the District
Court must also be upheld, as appellant makes no challenges
to his District court trial and conviction except the
jurisdictionalchallenge discussed herein.

Appellant's

argument that even if this Court upholds the certifi-
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cation that all proceedings in the District Court
should nevertheless be violated is untenable.

Such

a decision would render ineffective any trial court
holding where the defendant juvenile had not appealed
his certification order.

Thus, any juvenile who was

dissatisfied with his conviction or sentence in adult
court couldrave it set aside on the ground that the
District Court had no jurisdiction to act because
there was no appeal from the certifiction order.
Clearly, such was not the intent of this Court's
decision in the Atcheson Case, supra,

which allows

a juvenile to appeal directly from a certification order,
but does not require such an appeal before the District
Court obtains jurisdiction.
As is evident from the present appeal, the appellant
has never been denied his right to appeal. He now has a
full opportunity to have this Court consider any issues
concerning his certification with which he takes
exception.

If this Court finds that the certification

was improper, the appellant should be returned to the
jurisdiction of the Juvenile Court for whatever appropriate disposition remains available in the juvenile
system.

He should not simply be released as he proposes

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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(Appellant's Brief, p. 4).

If the certification is

upheld by this Court, the trial and conviction in
the District Court remains valid, and appellant
should continue to serve out his sentence.

There

would clearly be no reason to vacate all proceedings
in the District Court as appellant suggests.

sored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Ser
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POINT II
THE ORDER FOR CERTIFic-_::oN WAS A
REASOcJABLE EXERCISE O? ::scRETION
BASED O~ SUBSTANTIAL E-::J3NCE.

A.

The certification ==ier of the Juvenile
court should be Uf~sld if reasonable and
supported by substa:-. ':ial evidence.
~e.ld

This Court has consistently
cation is a discretionary
of Salas, 520 P2d. 874
and State, In InteJE&:
Sept. 21, 1978).

actio~,

that certifi-

3tate, In Interest

(Utah 19741, Atcheson, supra,
of~,

'.;:. 15557 (Utah, filed

The standard of =eview established

by the Atcheson case and reaffir-:'."_s:: in Giron is that
if the decision to certify is a "=e.asonable exercise
of discretion" based upon
order will be sustained,
183-184.

"substa~=ial
Atchesc~,

This policy conforms

~i':i

evidence," the

supra,

575 B2d at

generally accepted

standards of appellate review, es:;::-e.cially when the
judgment appealed from was discre':ionary in nature.
It is well settled that a j~igment of the trial
court is presumed to be cor=s:': if there is
reasonable evidence in the =s:ord to sustain
it and the reviewing court -...-:.:.1 not substitute
its discretion for that exe:ised by the trial
court.
Lancaster v. Chemi-::te Perlite Corporation, 511 P. 2d 673, 676 _:c_riz. 1973).
This court stated the same :;:::.icy in Bambrough v.
Bethers, 552 P. 2d 1286, 1290 (C=s:-_, 1976):

"The judg!:!ent
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of the trial court will not be reversed unless it is
shown that the discretion exercised therein has been
abused."

Therefore, under well-recognized rules of

appellate review, the decision to certify in the present
case must be affirmed absent a showing that the exercise
of discretion by Judge Hermansen was unreasonable or
not supported by substantial evidence.

No such showing

has been made by appellant in this case.
B.

The order of certification was based
on substantial evidence.

The criteria to be considered by the judge in a
certification hearing were set out by the U.S. Supreme
Court in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S. Ct.
1045 (1966), and substantially adopted in Rule (7)7 of
the Utah Juvenile Court Rules of Practice and Procedure.
The certificatimorder in the present case shows that
these criteria were properly considered (R. p. 7-8).
Moreover, as noted in the following analysis, there is
substantial evidence supporting the judge's determination to certify appellant in ligh~ of ~hese criteria.
Rule 7(7) sets out seven "factors which may bP
consinered by the court in deciding whether the juvenile
·
· ·
- such offense will be waived."
court's jurisdiction or
Although these factors are only "guidelines" for certi-

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servic
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fication (Giron, su7ra, p. 3),
established
are met,

that

w~en

certificat~on

~t

has been clearly

some or all of the criteria
is proper.

Atcheson, supra;

In re Welfare of Hernandez, 548 P. 2d 340 (Wash. 1976).
The following discussion analyzes the seven factors set
out in Rule 7(7) as applicable to the facts and
evidence presented
(a)

~n

this case.

The seriocsness of the alleged offense to the
community and whether the protection of the
community requires certification.

Appellant admits that one o= the crimes for which
he was convicted, aqgravated robbery, is of a serious
nature (Appellant's 3rief, p. 6).

However, appellant

fails to acknowledge the long list of crimes with which
he was initially charged, and which the juvenile court
judge had to consider at the time of the certification
hearing.

These charges included murder in the first

degree, aggravated assault, five counts of aggravated
robbery, three counts of aggravated burglary, and theft
(see Petition, R. p. ::-6).
such offenses are

nc~

Clearly, the argument that

serious car.not be maintained.

Furthermore, t'r :> court :fbund that the protection of
the community required certification
R. p.7).

This

find~~g

(Certificatio~

Order

was directly supported by the

testimony of two ex~ert witnesses (Tr. pp.78-79, 93)

and
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impliedly supported by the testi'mony of appellant's
probation officer (Tr.p. 54-55).

Th ere was no

testimony

that would support a contrary finding.
(b)

Whether the alleged offense was committed in
an aggressive, violent, premeditated or
willful manner.

It would seem that after reading the list of
charges in the petition, and the descriptions of the
activities of appellant given by the witnesses, it
would be difficult to allege that "There is no evidence
that the robberies were committed in an aggressive or
violent manner".

However, just such an assertion is

made by appellant herein (Appellant's Brief p.1).
By their very definition, ten of the eleven offenses
charged require some form of aggressiveness or violence.
For example, a burglary becomes an aggravated buglary
when the actor causes physical harm to another or
threatens immediate use of a dangerous or deadly weapon
against another U.C.A. §76-6-203.
Judge Hermansen acknowledged this in his certification order (R. p.7), and there is substantial evidence
independent of the inherent characteristics of the
. f'in d'ing.
charges to support h is

The record shows that

appellant shot at a neighbor during one robbery (Tr. p.5,
6,26) and made threats that amounted to violence in other

onsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Servi
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robberies
these

':r.411.

"non-~iole~t"

The record also shows that one of
incidents resulted in the death of

the robbery victim.

(Tr. 2 8) .

Also, the psychologist

who examinei apfellant testified that appellant has a
potential for violence and could be dangerous (Tr.p.93).
(c)

w:-iethe::: the alleged offenseswas against
f~rso~s or against property, greater weight
.being given to offense against persons
es?ecially if personal injury resulted.
t~e

From
clear that

nature of the offenses charged, it is

~he

c:::imes committed were against both

persons anc proferty.

The judge also considered this

factor as is clear from his order of certification
where he Sfecifi::ally found,"Tnat the said alleged
offenses were offenses against both persons and property•
(R. p. 7).

There can be no argument on this point and

appellant kakes
(d)

~one.

The desirability of trial and misposition of the
e~tire offense in one court when the juvenile's
associates in the alleged offense are adults
who wi 11 be charged with a crime in the District
Court.

While =.ppe::_:.ant feels that this factor is inap_::;licable
in this ca5e, J~ige Hermansen ~isely found it to be a
helpful

co~sideration

(R. p. 8).

It is ~rue ~hat appellant's accomplice is not an
adult, howe~er ~e was certified to stand trial in the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
-14-may contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,

District Court as an adult (R. p. 8).

Thus, the

underlying consideration of factor (d) is applicable
here and tends to favor certification.
(e)

~he s~phisticatioh and the maturity of the
Juvenile as determined by considerations
of his home, environmental situation
emotiona~ attitude, pattern of livin~, and
alleged involvement in the offense.

Although the certification order makes no mention
of this guideline, the record contains evidence supportive
of a finding that appellant is highly sophisticated.
Appellant selected the sites for the crimes (Tr.
p. 18), he planned them and made all the decisions
(Tr. p.

20).

Furthermore, appellant's own probation

counselor recommended

that certification take place

specifically because appellant's high level of sohistication required it (Tr. p. 54).
(f)

The record and previous history of the juvenile
including previous contacts with law enforcement agencies, juvenile courts and rehabilitative resources of the juvenile justice system
and the success or failure of past corrective
efforts in the juvenile system.

In his certification order Judge Hermansen states:
The court further notes that the said Aaron
Lee Greuber has a rather lengthy past record
of juvenile offenses of a serious nature
and that the rehabilitative resources of the
Juvenile Justice System have been ineffective
in correcting the conduct and life style of
this young man.
(R. p. 8)
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This

find::::~
~

the evide:i.ce.

is more than adequately supported bi
addition to the eleven offenses

char;e~

in the origina: ?etition, appellant committed many otter
violations,

See Tr. p. 51-52 for a lenghty list, all of

which were corrL-::.i tted during his second probation and
therefore do nc-:: include the initial violations that
placed ai:;?ella::-.-:: in the juvenile system, nor the recurring infractions that kept him there.
As n.'.)ted :..::: the statement of facts, supra, the
rehabilitative resources of the juvenile system had
been virtually exhausted with absolutely no measure
success.

o=

Appe::ant's probation counselor testified ttat

appellant's pr:=ation was completely unsuccessful
~~e

(Tr. p. 53).

counselor's supervisor testified that

no remedies available to the juvenile system would be
adequate (Tr. --;. . 76-77).
~~venile

also felt the
dealing with
rate,

t~e

ap?ella~-::

Appellant's examining psycholo<;::st
system was incapable of effective:v

problem

(Tr. p. 89) and that, at any

:acked the proper attitude for rehabi:i-

tation within -:::-.e time restraints of the juvenile sys-::e:::.
(Tr. p. 100).
The final

~~ideline

for determination of the cer-::i£:-

cation is:
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(g)

The ~rospects for adequate protection of the
public and the likelihood for reasonable
rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is
found to have committed the alleged offense)
by ~he use of procedures, services and facilities
available under order of the juvenile court
and whether the advantages and resources for
treatment and public safety lie with the
adult criminal court rather than the juvenile
court.

Judge Hermansen duly considered the relative merits
of the rehabilitative resources of the two systems and
concluded:
That the prospects for adequate protection
of the public and the likelihood for reasonable
rehabilitation of this said juvenile if he
is found to have committed the alleged
offenses by use of procedures and services
and facilities available under order of the
Juvenile Court are inadequate and the public
would be better served if this young man
were certified for treatment and programming
in the adult criminal system.
(R. p. 8)
A major concern on all the testifying experts
was that appellant needed to be secuIEl.y confined
for the protection of society (Tr. p. 54-55, 78-79,
81, 93).

Furthermore, both Atcheson, su?ra, 575 P. 2d

at 184, and Giron, supra, at p. 2, have acknowledged
that "The best interests of the public are equally as
vital as those of the minor".

In this case, when given

equal consideration, the public concern for safety and
security prevails against the appellants' interest in
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T~is

remaining in the juvenile system.
true because of the testimony which
juvenile system is ineffective in
treating the appellant.

is

s~ows

partic~iarly

that

:.~a

re~abilitatin~ :~

Thus, no sutstantial

pu~~~se

would be served in allowing appellant to stay ir. :.he
juvenile system, but an important public purpose ·. :as
served by transferring jurisdiction to the adul::.
system which can afford the necessar:: security ....·r,ile
still providing some rehabilitative treatment.
Therefore, because a
cretionary

actic~

certification crder is a

which in this case was based

substantial evidence, the decision o= the
Court should be
as valid.

affir~ed

by the juvenile court, and the

Ru~e

t~e

u~~eld

7(7) were :onsidered

evide~ce

relation to said criteria supports

o~

Juveni~a

and the certification

Each of the factors of

ci~

presentec

with

decision t:

transfer jurisdiction to the district court.
CONCLUSION
The right to

ap~eal

directly

order has been determined to exist
the

frc~
i~

a certification
Utah by

statutory language of U.C.A. §73-3a-51.

a juvenile is not com?elled to
prior to proceedings

appea~

rea~on

of

Ho~aver,

his certification

in adult court, and

failu~a

so has no effect upon the jurisdicticn of the

to do

D~s::.rict
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A direct appeal from c. cert~fication order is

:curt.
nc~ a

constitutionally protected ri;ht.

Therefore,

this Court's dismissal of appc:lant's original appeal
did not violate any due process risits. It is well
established that a judgment of the ~rial court is presu.~ed
t~e

to be correct if there is reasonable evidence in
Atc~eson,

record to sustain it.

at 183.

supra, 575 P. 2d

There is certainly rEasonajle evidence in the

::-ecord to sustain the order mc..:.e by the juvenile court
in the present case and no
'."las or can be made.

shc¥~ng

: f abuse of discretion

The appel:a'.1t -..;as afforded a full

investigatim and a fair hearir_; on all matters relevant
to the question of certificati c:-,.

:'he evidence adduced

at the hearing fully justifies the ~rder transferring
jurisdiction in these circumst.ances.
Therefore, the certification c::·der of the Juvenile
Court and the conviction and sentence in the District
Court should be affirmed.
Res~~ctf~:ly

ROBE?T B.

subnitted,

H&~SE~

Attc ::-::i.ey :?eneral
SHAF.'.J:l pE._:,,COCK
Assistant Attorney General

Attc ::-::eys for Respondent
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